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ESPIONAGE WITH MODERN TECHNOLOGY:
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Dr. V.V. Kadam*

INTRODUCTION
Information regarding security, military strength and capabilities of potential
adversaries offers a significant advantage in framing the military and defence
policies of a State. Although all military developments are shrouded in utmost
secrecy, efficient espionage efforts may succeed in penetrating the veil of secrecy
to gather necessary information. It of course depends upon the efficiency of the
State in collecting the information furtively. Traditional methods of intelligence
gathering substantially relied on human beings for this purpose. But with the
advent of technology, novel imd sophisticated devices to collect information from
considerable distances have been developed. Thus, collection of intelligence data
by employing technological devices from a long distance has come to be known
as 'reconnaissance'.
Whereas, espionage
or spying envisages collection
of
intelligence data by using secret service agents who are, in most cases, sent to
the state regarding which information is to be collected.
The legal implications
of secret information
gathering
with modern
technology needs to be examined with reference to two legal systems. Firstly, the
internal legal systems of states which regulate activities occurring within their
respective territories specifically deal with espionage and related activities under
their criminal laws. Secondly, the international
legal system which regulates
activities of nation-states can also be invoked. However, it would be fallacious to
bring all information gathering process under one banner to examine their legal
implications. Therefore, in the first instance they must be divided into territorial
and extraterritorial
reconnaissance.

RECONNAISSANCE·
Territorial

TERRITORIAL AND EXTRA-TERRITORIAL.

reconnaissance

is conducted

by entering

into the territory

of

another state regarding
which information
is being collected. This type of
reconnaissance
is very similar to traditional methods of spying by individuals
who are secretly sent to other states. But in territorial reconnaissance
modern
equipment can be used to coiled information not only within the land territory
of that State, but also from its air space and territorial waters. Before the advent
of space technology,
the most common type of reconnaissance
was aerial
reconnaissance.
Territorial
reconnaissance
is also called as 'Penetrative'
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reconnaissance

because it is conducted

by penetrating

the territorial

domain of a

state.l
The other type i.e. extra-territorial

reconnaissance

which is also known as

'peripher;d reconnaissance'
is conducted without entering into the territory of
tLe concerned state.2 This is possible only because of the technological devices
developed to collect information from considerable distances. Thus, reconnaissance
from international
airspace, high seas, outer space and in some cases, from the
territory of another state, fall in this category.
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

OF TERRITORIAL

RECONNAISSANCE

For all practical purposes, territorial
reconnaissance
can be likened to
traditional espionage. Espionage is a serious crime under the internal laws of all
states. The legislations relating to internal security, official secrets or even general
criminal codes define the offence of espionage and make it punishable
with
severe punishment. This is obvious because, firstly, the offence relates to the
security of the state, and secondly, because it is committed by violating and
undermining
territorial sovereignty of the state. Thus, the perpetrators
of this
offence come within the jurisdiction of the state authorities where the state laws
are applicable and effectively enforceable
Although territorial reconnaissance
involving modern technology, such as an aircraft furtively collecting photographic
or electronic data by entering into the airspace of a potential adversary state,
can be treated as 'espionage' for the purposes of the internal legal system, yet
some more complex questions of law arise in such cases.
The first legal question that arises in dealing with territorial reconnaisance
is securing the custody of the offenders. If it is conducted from within the
territory or the territorial waters, this may not pose a serious problem. But as
regards aerial reconnaissance,
secu~ing the custody is almost impossible unless
the aircraft is compelled to land. However it is not very easy to compel an
aircraft to land and hence, if that is not possible, the aggrieved state may decide
to use military force against such aircraft. During the past, states have not
hesitated to destroy reconnaissance
aircrafts in flight. This
amounts to an
extreme case of exercise of jurisdiction,
but in internal laws as well as in
international
law such state commits no wrong. In such cases since invasion of
territorial airspaGe is quite apparent, it amounts to violation of a fundamental
right of a state well recognised by international
law. Thus a state engaged in
aerial reconnaissance
takes a calculated risk in such cases. It is also likely that
the aggrieved state succeeds in compelling the aircraft to land in the state territory.
In both the cases the aircraft and other equipments used for reconnaissance
can
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be seized and the pilot prosecuted for the offence of espionage. Thus in May
1960 the Soviet forces shot at a U. S. U-2 reconnaissance
aircraft while it was in
Soviet airspace which had taken off from a base in Pakistan.:' The pilot, who
survived the crash landing, was eventually arrested, prosecuted and convicted.
This legal action was not questioned by the Americans because it was in conformity
with well established principles of national and international laws.
However, more complicated
legal questions will arise if a state uses a
civilian aircraft engaged in scheduled air traffic for aerial reconnaissance.
First
of all, this will be contrary to the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation, 1944.
Secondly, such an act will be violative of the internal laws of the state spied
upon as well as international
law relating to territorial sovereignty. A crucial
legal question that arises here is whether the aggrieved state can use military
force against such aircraft with impunity ? This was an unresolved issue in
aviation law for a long time, but it came to the forefront in the wake of downing
of the Korean Airlines Flight 007 by the Soviet authorities in the early hours of
1st September
1983. Although it was eventually established that the aircraft
entered into the Soviet airspace by mistake, yet according to the Soviet authorities,
their Anti-Aircraft Defence Forces' concerned command concluded at that time
that a civilian aircraft engaged in reconnaissance
was heading towards the state
frontier of the U.S.S.R.1 But since the aircraft was destroyed, there was no proof
that it was engaged in reconnaissance.
Nevertheless, presuming that a civilian
aircraft on a scheduled flight is used for reconnaissance
by a state unlawfully, is
it reasonable
to destroy
the aircraft in flight carrying hundreds of innocent
passengers? This question was extensively discussed in the International
Civil
Aviation Organisation,
a specialised agency of the United Nations dealing with
Civil aviation, after the Korean Airlines incident. The Chicago convention of
1944, which did not have an effective answer to this question, was eventually
amended to deal with such situations. Now, if it is suspected by a state that a
civilian aircraft flying in its airspace is engaged in reconnaissance,
such state
cannot use military force against such aircraft but may compel it to land in its
territory and examine it with a view to find out if it was really engaged in any
such activity. But this protection is not available to a state aircraft engaged
purely in reconnaissance
because the Chicago Convention is not applicable to
state aircrafts. It is perhaps because of the risk involved in aerial reconnaissance
from an aircraft that some advanced states have developed unmanned vehicle
systems (UVS) for low level reconnaissance
for use in hazardous or inhospitable
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(Needless to mention, an unmanned remotely piloted vehicle
engaged in collection of strategic information violates territorial sovereignty and
the territorial state may take any action against such vehicle including its
destruction).
environments.5

Reconnaissance conducted from a ship anchored in the port of another
state or while passing through the territorial waters of such state also amounts
to territorial reconnaissance. In the International law of the sea, all ships are
entitled to pass through territorial waters of other states in the course of navigation
without obtaining prior permission of the coastal state. This is known as the
right of innocent passage which is subject to certain conditions. One of the
conditions is that a ship exercising this right must refrain from collecting
information regarding security of the coastal state. Thus, article 14 (4) of the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone convention of 1958 provides that passage
is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
the coastal state. Article 19 of the new United Nations Convention on Law of the
Sea, 1982 is more specific in that it provides that passage of a ship shall be
considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
state if in the territorial sea it engaged in, inter alia, any act aimed at collecting
information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal state.
Besides violating international law, such a ship will also violate the internal laws
of the coastal state regarding espionage and hence be liable to be confiscated
and the persons on board arrested and prosecuted. Reconnaissance from a ship
anchored in a port or passing through internal waters can be treated as espionage
for the purpose of the law of the coastal state and necessary legal action against
the ship and people on board is possible.
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

OF EXTRA-TERRITORIAL

RECONNAISSANCE.

Technological advancements in the fields of electronics and distant
photography offered a distinct advantage to the defence establishments of advanced
states in that they could collect strategic irlformation regarding a potential
adversary without entering into the territory of such state. In other words, they
relied more and more on extra-territorial reconnaissance such as aerial
reconnaissance from international airspace, naval reconnaissance from high seas
and later, satellite reconnaissance from outer space. The most obvious advantage
of the new technology was that it avoided the risk of entering into the territorial
domain of a state to collect information. Therefore the legal implications of
extra-territorial reconnaissance in international as well as internal laws are totally
different from those of territorial reconnaissance. In order to examine these
implications, a further classification of extra-territorial reconnaissance is necessary
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here. Allhough satellite reconnaissance
stands out as the most significant type of
extra· territorial reconnaissance, aerial and naval reconnaissance are the forerunners
of satellite reconnaissance
and are still in vogue in some nations. Therefore, a
brief word regarding these types of reconnaissance
will serve as a background
for examining the legal implications of satellite reconnaissance.
International
airspace, i. e. airspace above the high seas is open for all
states for use and enjoyment. States have enjoyed a large measure of freedom in
international
airspcce and civilian as well as military activities are routinely
conducted
in this airspace by various states. This freedom is derived from
customary as well as treaty law of the sea in the form of freedom of over flight
which is one of the freedoms of the high seas. As a part of this freedom, states
have routinely flown reconnaissance
aircrafts in international airspace adjoining
the airspace of adversaries so as to collect strategic data. Since such aircrafts
remain outside the territorial airspace, they do not violate territorial sovereignty
of the other states. Besides, they remain outside the jurisdiction of the concerned
state and may not violate internal law of such state regarding espionage. Thus
no legal or forcible action against such aircraft is permissible. In July 1960, a U.
S. reconnaissance
aircraft which was flying in international
airspace adjoining
Soviet Union was' shot down by the Soviet Forces. This was extensively criticised
by the Americans by asserting that the U. S. was not guilty of violation of
international
law as well as the Soviet laws. The Soviets too, albeit implicity,
admitted

the illegalty of their action.

It is also possible to coiled intelligence data regarding a nearby state, from
a ship sailing on the high seas without entering into the territorial waters of
such state. States have traditionally enjoyed the freedom of the high seas which
is very well founded in international
law of the sea. However, it is generally
agreed that high seas may be used for peaceful purposes only.7 But the term
'peaceful' has been interpreted by many states to mean 'non-aggressive'
and not
'non-military'. As a consequence all military activities which are not aggressive in
nature are freely carried out on the high seas. Intelligence gathering can be
treated as a non-aggressive
military activity, and hence permitted on the high
seas. Not only the high seas, but even the sea bed of the high seas offer
considerable
military potential as evidenced by the U. S Sonar Surveillance
System which monitors positions of hostile nuclear submarines by using submarine
cables and hydrophones.x As noted earlier, a ship passing through the territorial
waters cannot engage in reconnaissance
because it would be derogatory to the
right of innocent passage and also amount to the violation of the laws of the
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coastal state. However, a ship passing through the contiguous
exclusive economic zone may very well engage in reconnaissance

zone or the
because it is

then not doing anything contradictory to the specific rights of a coastal state in
these zones. Limited jurisdiction of a coastal state is exercisable in the contiguous
zone and the exclusive economic zone. The laws relating to internal security or
official secrets are not applicable and enforceable beyond territorial waters against
foreign ships in the ordinary course.
With

this

background,

it would

now be expedient

to turn

to satellite

reconnaissance
which happens to be the favourite activity of states possessing
sophisticated space technology. As a matter of fact such states are few in number
but some of them have routinely and extensively conducted satellite reconnaissance
with remarkable accuracy and success. The U. S. and the U. S . S. R. with mutual
knowledge and tacit understanding,
extensively relied on satellite reconnaissance
for collecting strategic data regarding each others' military developments
and
preparedness.
[n fact impetus was given to advances in space technology to
refine and articulate satellite technology so that it would subserve military and
strategic ends. All these developments culminated in the use of satellites for a
variety of military applications which can be outlined as under.
1)

Photographic

reconnaissance,

2)

Electronic

3)

Ocean surveillance,

4)

Early warning,

5)

Military communications,

6)

Guidance of naval ships and submarines,

7)

Meteorology,

8)

Geodesy, and

9)

as components

reconnaissance,

of ballistic missile defence systems.

Out of these the first three types of satellites are of particular interest for
the purposes of the subject matter under discussion, and. hence need to be
examined at length. Photographic
reconnaissance
satellites are equipped with
powerful cameras capable of taking detailed pictures from outer space. They
detect, locate and identify military targets.!! These satellites may be equipped
with television cameras, multispectral scanners and microwave radars.1o Some
American and Russian photo-reconnaissance
satellites are capable of distinguishing

9.
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objects smaller than 30 cms. from an altitude of 185 kms. or more.1l It is
estimated
that of all military satellites so far launched,
40 % are photoreconnaissance
satellites.
With remarkable
advances
in remote sensing technology,
electronic
equipment capable of 'sensing'data
from outer space have been developed. These
equipments when carried on board satellites in outer space, collect information
regarding
missile testing, radar stations, armament
depots, movement
and
concentration
of troops, atomic explosions, etc. and relay it to ground stations.
Some of these satellites are also capable of intercepting communications
of other
states by monitoring radio signals.
Ocean surveillance satellites help locate naval ships including submarines.
They carry radars which can practically see through clouds and detect almost
every seaborne object even small pleasure boats.12 The oceanographic
data so
collected is relayed to ground stations and therefrom to submarines which, in
case of an armed conflict, can use it with considerable advantage to launch an
attack against hostile submarines. The whole idea is to enhance efficiency of
naval power in maritime warfare. Otherwise too, the data relayed by such satellites
could be used to trace the movement of hostile naval ships and submarines.

LEGAL IJI1PLICATIONS OF SA TELLITE RECONNAISSANCE
In the early days of satellite reconnaissance,
many states considered it to be
an activity contrary to international law for a variety of reasons. It was regarded
by the Soviets as 'espionage' and contrary to Soviet laws, thus assimilating all
form of intelligence gathering to only one. At one time, the Soviets even went to
the extent of warning the Americans that forcible action may be taken against
novel means of espionage and that such action will be fully justified by existing
international law including the United Nations charter. J:l In asserting that satellite
reconnaissance
is illegal, it was labelled as 'space espionage' and treated as
encroachment
from outside and violation of the legal regime of airspace as
established by the Chicago Convention of 1944.1~
Another
reconnaissance

11.

strange
accusation
of Soviet Union was that presence
of
satellites in outer space amounted to threat of force or even an
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103 (Jasani cd.,

act of aggression against the state which was being observed. It was also argued
that presence of such satellites in outer space is a direct threat to national
security which fully justified self-defence measures. I:' Since it threatens
the
territorial integrity and national sovereignty, it was claimed by the Soviets, that
the use of satellites for military surveillance is an aggressive activity. iii
Not unreasonably,

the inability of developing

countries

to control

satellite

reconnaissance
of their territory or to use effective concealment and camouflage
for their strategically
sensitive targets against surveillance
has caused such
countries to be increasingly concerned about the implications of these activities
for their national security and other interests.17
towards legality of satellite reconnaissance
uncertainty.

The developing countries' attitude
was marked by confusion
and

In order to examine the legal implications of satellite reconnaissance,
first it
would be expedient to examine the relevant provisions of the Outer Space
Treaty, 1967, the basic convention on space law. Article IV of the treaty which
deals with military activities forbids placing of nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction
in outer space. It also categorically and comprehensively
prohibits all types of military activities on celestial bodies. The cumulative effect
of both the provisions is that it partially deweaponises outer space and completely
demilitarises celestial bodies. Except stationing of nuclear weapons and weapons
of mass destruction, other military activities are permitted in outer space by the
Treaty. It is also possible to invoke article III of the Treaty to examine legality of
satellite reconnaissance. This article obliges the states parties to carryon activities
in outer space in accordance with international law in the interest of maintaining
international
peace and security. This raises two questions.
Can satellite
reconnaissance
be regarded as an activity which is in accordance
with the
objective of maintenance of international peace and security? Further, can it be
regarded as an activity which is in accordance with international
questions need to be answered to see whether satellite reconnaissance
article III of the Treaty.

law? These
contravenes

It is generally recognized that since satellite reconnaissance makes a surprise
attack much more difficult and also allows monitoring and verification of arms
control agreements, it has made an important contribution to the security of all
nations. IX A Canadian Working Paper submitted in 1982 to the United Nations
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Committee on Disarmament,
on the basis of an examination of the stabilising
and destabilising
effects of military satellites, concludes that reconnaissance
satellites tend on balance to stabilise deterrence.I!' Some bilateral agreements
between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. also regarded use of reconnaissance
satellites as lawful, albeit indirectly. Thus article XII (I) of the Antiballistic Missile
Treaty, 1972 provides that

(f) or the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty, each shall use national technical means of
verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law.
This provision is also to be found in Article V of the Interim Agreement
between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. On Certain Measures With Respect to the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I agreement). Although there was
no direct reference to satellite reconnaissance,
yet it was understood
in the
context of both the agreements that 'national technical means of verification'
implied reconnaissance
satellites. In view of this, and otherwise also, satellite
reconnaissance can hardly be regarded as an activity which endangers international
peace as such.
Another

requirement

laid down by Article III is that all activities

in outer

space must be in accordance with international
law. In this context it may be
extra
noted that outer space has always been regarded
as territorium
commercium, i.e territory or areas which cannot form part of a state. It can,
therefore, be likened to high seas as well as international airspace. These global
commons are open for all nations for use and enjoyment except and insofar as
certain acts are specifically prohibited therein by international law. The extensive
practice of using high seas and international
airspace for extraterritorial
reconnaissance
can be said to have developed a customary norm of international
law which permits use of 'global commons' for reconnaissance.
Besides, satellite
reconnaissance
does not violate territorial sovereignty of a state since it is
conducted from a place outside the territorial domain of a state. Therefore it can
be regarded as an activity which is in accordance with international
law. Thus
article III of the Outer Space Treaty is not violated.
The United
contrary
to the
interpretation
of
has consistently
military'. Thus

19.

States, in order to assert that satellite reconnaissance
is not
Outer Space Treaty, based its argument
on the basis of
the term 'peaceful' as used in the treaty in a certain manner. It
argued that 'peaceful' means 'non-aggressive', rather than 'nonsatellite reconnaissance
is a peaceful activity because it is
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non-aggressive.
It is also contended that since satellite reconnaissance
helps
supervision of arms control agreements and makes a surprise attack difficult, it
can be regarded as a peaceful activity?'
It is also possible to argue that because of extensive state practice in the
field of satellite reconnaissance,
a rule in customary space law has- emerged
which confers legitimacy on this activity in the absence of a specific treaty
provision to the contrary.21 In this connection it is interesting to note a suggestion
made to ensure that satellite reconnaissance
does not attain the status of
international
legal customary rule,
official protests and also argue the
satellites without prior permission
international
law and the Outer

viz. that non-space countries must present
illegality of acquiring military information by
of the subject state by relying on general
Space Treaty.22 In our submission,
neither

general international
law nor the Outer Space Treaty consider
and secondly, now it is too late to raise objections to satellite
because it has already attained legitimacy in international law.

it to be illegal,
reconnaissance

Once we accept the fact that satellite reconnaissance
is not an unlawful
activity, another crucial question needs to be addressed. We have stated that
satellite reconnaissance
is not unlawful mainly because it is conducted
from
outer space. But then we must be able to tell with precision where the airspace
ends and outer space begins, or in other words, there should be a boundary
between ;lirspace and outer space, delimiting these spatial zones. This issue is
crucial not only in the context of satellite
reconnaissance,
but also for
determination
of legitimacy of all other space activities. Though the issue is so
vital in international
law, it is deliberately not settled by the leading space
powers, especially the United States. The obvious advantage of non-delimitation
is that space powers may launch space objects with lower and lower altitudes
and claim that they are in outer space and not in airspace. Thus, delimitation
would invariably inhibit all types of military activities in outer space. States
having particular
interest in use of outer space for military purposes
are
procrastinating
delimitation and consequently impairing progress in general legal
regulation of space activities. With stupendous
advances in
space technology, it is possible to have aircrafts which can
higher altitudes and spacecrafts attaining lower and lower
making it difficult to distinguish
between an aircraft and

both aviation and
fly at higher and
altitudes, thereby
a spacecraft. The

20.
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present reusable American space shuttle is launched with a booster but while
landing it operates like an aircraft. There are reports that the U. S. is developing
a more efficient
and smaller
reusable
spacecraft
presently
known as
transatmospheric
vehicle or TAV which could be used for reconnaissance, strate~ic
defence
and even surface attack.2:l In endo-atmospheric
flight i. e. within the
atmosphere
or below 50 miles altitude it flies almost as fast and as high as a
satellite, but it can manoeuvre aerodynamically, like an aircraft, to evade attack
or to orient itself towards a target or reconnaissance
objective.2~ Also it is
significant to note that it will take-off and land like an aircraft with only 10, 000
feet runway, and if necessary, fly out to geostationary orbit as wel1.2;'
The Americans have advocated a functional approach

to determine

legitimacy

of space activities. Thus, it is contended that lawfulness of a space activity can be
determined with reference to the function of a space object rather than its locus.
This approach is not acceptable to many states who contend that lawfulness of a
space activity can be determined with reference to the place from which it is
conducted. This necessarily requires a spatial delimitation of airspace and outer
space. In international
law activities in airspace and outerspace are regulated by
distinct regimes of law and this legal fact presupposes
that airspace and outer
space are properly delineated and are distinct from each other. In our submission,
such delimitation
will certainly facilitate legal regulation of various types of
space activities and will help maintain order in outer space.
SPYING

WITH MODERN

TECHNOLOGY

AND THE INDIAN LA WS.

In India the offence of spying is dealt with by the Official Secrets Act 1923
as amended from time to lime. The offence of spying is committed by approaching,
entering or inspecting a prohibited area or place or by making sketches or notes,
or by obtaining or communicating
secret codes, plans, models, documents, etc.
which mi~ht be useful to an enemy or which relates to a matter, the disclosure
of which is likely to affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security or
state or friendly relations with foreign states?i The Act deals with two types of
spying-one relating to defence establishments and activities, and the other relating
to civilian public works of considerable significance such as dams, airports, etc.
Spying on defence related activities is punishable with fourteen years imprisonment
and on non-defence
matters, three years.27 Quite understandably,
the major
thrust of the Act is on espionage conducted by individuals. But the same provisions

23.

Supra. n. 5 at 54 .

24.
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27.
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can be invoked to deal with some forms of reconnaissance with modern technology,
provided that it is conducted by entering into the territory or territorial waters
or airspace of India, because these are the places where the Act is applicable.28
The provisions of the Act are comprehensive
so as to deal with aerial or naval
territorial reconnaissance.
It is apparent
that satellite reconnaissance
does not
contravene
the Act since it is conducted from a place where the Act is not
applicable. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that international
law permits
extra-territorial
application of defence and security related laws on the basis of
what is known as 'protective principle' of jurisdiction. Thus, a state may exercise
jurisdiction in respect of a crime against its security or its vital economic interests
irrespective of the place where the crime is committed.2!1 This is so because the
offences subject to the application of the protective principle are such that their
consequences
may be of utmost gravity and concern to the state against which
they are directed, and secondly, unless the jurisdiction
is so extended, many
such offences would escape punishment because they did not contravene the law
of the place where they were committed.:10 Although some states' security related
laws incorporate
the protective principles of jurisdiction,
the Indian Official
Secrets Act does not contain any provision to that effect. Basically there is
considerable
impracticality in extra-territorial
application of protecti'Je principle
because of the difficulties in obtaining the custody of the offenders. This is more
so in connection
with extra-territorial
reconnaissance
conducted
from long
distances by using modern technology.

The changing nature of intelligence gathering
Two important developments pertaining to the field of espionage that have
taken place during the recent past are: firstly, the demise of the Soviet Union
and end of Cold War; and secondly, growing incidence of industrial and economic
espionage. A brief word regarding developments and use of modern technology
for espionage will be appropriate here.
Because

of the existence

of two potential

adversaries

during

the Cold War

period, most of espionage was directed against each other and others' allies.
During the post-Cold War period, the signs are that former adversaries
are
joining hands to conduct espionage more effectively to combat new threats to
international
security and order like terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass
destruction
and drug trafficking. Some states have focussed their intelligence
priorities towards regional conflicts In the Balkans and the former Soviet republics.
For this purpose the modern means of intelligence gathering are quite useful
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and effective. More interesting
is the increasing
incidence
of industrial,
technological and economic espionage. During the last few decades it was more
or less accepted that many private commercial establishments indulge in industrial
espionage. What is now alarming is increasing state sponsored technological
espionage. It has been reported that since the Third World countries and former
communist
states do not have the money to buy or develop sophisticated
technology, they tend to take a short cut by stealing technological, scientific and
commercial secrets from more advanced countries.]] There are also reports that
even states like China, France, Japan, Russia, and the U. S. indulge in industrial
and economic espionage. In this connection it is interesting to note that in
November 1993 it was suggested in the U. S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence that private firms be allowed to collect and sell satellite observation
photos taken by official agencies that can distinguish objects one meter in size
from about 300 kms up.]~
Thus, it is possible to envisage use of modern technology as well as the
traditional means of espionage i.e. spying with secret agents for industrial and
technological
espionage. Although this type of spying is usually not directed
against the state security, it undoubtedly violates the intellectual property rights
of concerned commercial and other establishments.
CONCLUSIONS
Spying is a very serious crime in the internal legal systems of all states, but
international
law as such does not prohibit it. It can be contained effectively if it
is conducted by entering into the territorial domain of a state simply because of
the physical
proximity,
irrespective
of the fact whether
it is conducted
conventionally
or by using modern technology. The national laws relating to
defence, security or official secrets afford the legal basis for state action in
dealing with such spying. However, when information is collected from a place
outside the jurisdiction of a state, technological inability of such a state and lack
of a legal basis for forcible action in international law will prevent the state from
containing
the activity. In international
law states enjoy a large measure of
freedom of action in the 'global commons' or international
spaces. Collection of
information
from such places or spaces from long distances which is feasible
because of modern technology is not regulated by international law and hence it
can be described as an activity permitted by law, howsoever pernicious it may be
to the interests of other states. This highlights how international law is sometimes
deliberately left undeveloped to subserve self interests of a powerful few.
The growing

tendency

to rely on spying for modern
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technology,

especially

state sponsored industrial espionage is indicative of further degeneration
of
international
morality. Although it directly impinges upon intellectual property
rights in most of the cases, in the absence of effective international
mechanisms
to enforce such rights, such violation remains unhindered. The only commendable
feature of changing nature of espionage is the possibility of use of modern
espionage technology for dealing with some serious international
problems like
terrorism, drug trafficking, spread of weapons of mass destruction, etc. However
it is almost certain that very little use of the technology will be made for such
beneficial objectives and most of the technology will be exploited to subserve
national self-intersts by the states possessing it. History is replete with situations
wherein states did not hesitate to take advantage
of meagre international
regulation and control to dominate others and thereby enhance relative power.
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